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Humans adapt their behavior not only by observing
the consequences of their actions but also by inter-
nally monitoring their performance. This capacity,
termed metacognitive sensitivity [1, 2], has tradition-
ally been denied to young children because they
have poor capacities in verbally reporting their own
mental states [3–5]. Yet, these observations might
reflect children’s limited capacities for explicit self-re-
ports, rather than limitations in metacognition per se.
Indeed, metacognitive sensitivity has been shown to
reflect simple computational mechanisms [1, 6–8],
and can be found in various non-verbal species
[7–10]. Thus, it might be that this faculty is present
early in development, although it would be discernible
through implicit behaviors and neural indices rather
than explicit self-reports. Here, by relying on such
non-verbal indices, we show that 12- and 18-month-
old infants internally monitor the accuracy of their
owndecisions. At the behavioral level, infants showed
increased persistence in their initial choice after mak-
ing a correct as compared to an incorrect response,
evidencing an appropriate evaluation of decision con-
fidence. Moreover, infants were able to use decision
confidence adaptively to either confirm their initial
choice or change their mind. At the neural level, we
found that a well-established electrophysiological
signature of error monitoring in adults, the error-
related negativity, is similarly elicited when infants
make an incorrect choice. Hence, although explicit
forms of metacognition mature later during child-
hood, infants already estimate decision confidence,
monitor their errors, and use these metacognitive
evaluations to regulate subsequent behavior.
RESULTS
Here we tested whether two coremetacognitive processes, deci-
sion confidence and error monitoring, are already present in
infancy. We developed a non-verbal procedure in which 18- and
12-month-old infants made a binary decision that allowed3038 Current Biology 26, 3038–3045, November 21, 2016 ª 2016 Th
This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativemeasuring performance at the cognitive (i.e., first-order) level.
Post-decision measurements then allowed assessing infants’
metacognitive (i.e., second-order) abilities. For confidence (exper-
iments 1–3), we relied on a behavioral measure reflecting infants’
willingness to search for a reward depending on the accuracy of
their decision. Studies in rats suggest that similar measures of
post-decision persistence reflect a metacognitive computation
of confidence [7, 11]. More precisely, rats’ willingness to wait for
a reward can be accounted for by a simple model in which confi-
dence is estimated by comparing the accumulated evidence
against the decision bound [7]. Importantly, this process involves
the orbito-frontal cortex, a region distinct from areas involved in
first-order decisions [12] but analogous to areas involved inmeta-
cognition in humans [13]. For error detection (experiment 3), we
relied on a neural marker well documented in adults. Specifically,
by probing for the presence of the error-related negativity (ERN),
an electroencephalography (EEG) component observed when-
ever subjects make an error [1, 14, 15], we tested whether the
mechanisms responsible for error monitoring in adults are already
functional in 12-month-old infants.
18-Month-Old Infants Monitor Decision Confidence
In experiment 1, 18-month-old infants (n = 29) saw an object
being hidden in one of two opaque boxes and, after a delay,
were asked to point to indicate where the object was concealed
(see Figure 1A and the Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
First-order performance on this task was assessed along a para-
metric variation of difficulty (i.e., memorizing the location of the
toy for a brief or longer delay). Immediately following this choice,
infants were provided with the selected box. The amount of time
they were willing to search within this box before giving up was
used as a measure of post-decision persistence. Importantly,
persistence times (PTs) were measured in the absence of any
external feedback on performance, allowing us to use this mea-
sure as a proxy for confidence [7].
Infants pointed toward the correct box with above chance-
level accuracy (t(28) = 4.9; p < 0.001) but experienced more
difficulty as memorization delay increased: accuracy was
significantly above chance level for the shortest delay of 3 s
(t(25) = 2.81; p < 0.01) but not for any of the longer delays (all
p values > 0.06; Figure S1). We then examined whether infants’
persistence in their initial choice correlated with accuracy.
Consistent with our hypothesis, we observed that infants
searched longer in the box following correct as compared to
incorrect decisions (t(28) = 2.1; p < 0.05). To ensure that oure Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
commons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Figure 1. Experiment 1
(A) Experimental design. During the familiarization phase (four trials), the infant saw the experimenter hide a toy in one of two opaque boxes. The experimenter
then asked her to point to indicate where she remembered the toy to be. As soon as the infant produced a pointing response, the selected box was pushed
forward to allow retrieving the toy. The test phase (eight trials) was similar except for two aspects. First, a variable memorization delay (3, 6, 9, or 12 s) was
introduced, during which a curtain was closed to occlude the boxes from the infant’s view. Second, unbeknownst to the child, the toys were now out of reach
during the searching period (i.e., hidden within an unreachable pocket inside the box), so as to measure infants’ persistence. As soon as infants gave up
searching, the experimenter recovered the toy from the box and showed it to the infant before either (1) replacing it in the box and letting the infant recover it after a
correct response, or (2) starting a new trial when no response or an incorrect response was given by the infant.
(B) Mean type 2 ROC curve. Individual type 2 ROC curves were constructed by plotting the probability of searching for a certain amount of time for correct trials
against the probability of searching for an equivalent amount of time for incorrect trials, cumulated across persistence time (PT) terciles. The gray area between
the ROC curve and the diagonal is an estimate of the extent to which infants searched longer for correct versus incorrect trials: a type 2 ROC curve departing
upward from the diagonal indicates that participants were more likely to search longer for correct over incorrect trials. The dashed line represents the minor
diagonal; the solid thick line corresponds to the ROC curve; and the thin solid line corresponds to the major diagonal. Area under the ROC curve is shown in gray.
(C) Relationship between PTs and accuracy depending on task difficulty. PTs were averaged separately for correct and incorrect trials for each level of difficulty.
(D) Mean accuracy as a function of task difficulty, computed separately for short (<median) and long (>median) PTs. Although PTs did not significantly predict
accuracy when all conditions were collapsed (c2 = 2.54; p = 0.1), there was a significant interaction between PTs and delay (c2 = 6.34; p < 0.02). In the 3-s
condition, accuracy was lower for short PTs as compared to long PTs (t(25) = 2.85; p < 0.01). Importantly, the accuracy for short PTs did not differ from chance
level (t(25) = 0.38; p > 0.7), whereas the accuracy for long PTs was greatly above chance (t(25) = 4.79; p < 0.001). Mean accuracy did not differ from chance level
even when dividing PTs in deciles and considering only the tenth-shortest PTs (t(25) = 0.4; p > 0.7).
Error bars show SEMs. See also Figure S1.results were not contaminated by individual biases in searching
more or less in the box (e.g., liberal versus conservative profiles),
we performed a complementary non-parametric and bias-free
analysis [16, 17]. PT terciles were computed to approximate a
three-point confidence scale and construct individual type 2
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves [16, 17] (Figure 1B
and the Supplemental Experimental Procedures). Mean area un-
der the type 2 ROC curves was significantly greater than chance
level (t(28) = 2.09; p < 0.03), suggesting that, independent of in-
dividual searching biases, infants persisted more in their choices
after a correct as compared to an incorrect choice.
Although this result suggests that infants displayed metacog-
nitive sensitivity, a potential concern might be that infants’
persistence reflected the strength of the memory trace used toperform the initial choice (i.e., a first-order decision variable),
rather than a metacognitive evaluation (i.e., a second-order
monitoring of the decision variable). More precisely, it might be
that infants simply search longer when their memory about the
toy location is strong. Given that accuracy also depends on
this memory trace, a spurious correlation between accuracy
and persistence might also be expected in this case. Our manip-
ulation of the memorization delay was specifically introduced to
disentangle these two interpretations. Indeed, a first-order inter-
pretation predicts a direct correlation between PTs and delay,
because the memory trace allegedly fades out with time. By
contrast, a metacognitive interpretation predicts that (1) persis-
tence should depend on accuracy, as long as a reliable memory
trace is available (i.e., for above chance-level performance), andCurrent Biology 26, 3038–3045, November 21, 2016 3039
(2) that the correlation between persistence and accuracy should
vanish when no reliable memory trace is available (i.e., for
chance-level performance) (see [7] for a computational account).
Consistent with this last interpretation, we found an interaction
between delay and accuracy (c2 = 8.97; p < 0.03; likelihood ratio
test; mixed models were used because of missing cells; see the
Supplemental Experimental Procedures) but no main effect of
memorization delay (c2 = 3.16; p > 0.3). This interaction was
due to infants searching less following incorrect as compared
to correct trials only when accuracy was above chance (i.e., for
the shortest delay of 3 s; c2 = 10; p < 0.01; see Figure 1C).
Another signature of confidence is that performance should
fall to chance level for the lowest levels of confidence (i.e., here
for the shortest PTs). Thus, we also examined accuracy as a
function of PTs andmemorization delay (see Figure 1D). A mixed
logistic regression revealed a significant interaction (c2 = 6.34;
p < 0.02), reflecting the fact that PTs significantly predicted ac-
curacy in the easy condition (i.e., at 3 s: c2 = 7.8; p < 0.01), but
not at any of the longer delays (all p values > 0.3). Interestingly,
the intercept of the regression did not differ from chance level
(estimate: 0.14 ± 0.13; p > 0.2). Thus, short PTs do not predict
accuracy below 50% but rather correspond to chance-level
performance, as would be expected for a true marker of confi-
dence. This result also suggests that PTs reflect confidence
rather than error monitoring. Indeed, for error monitoring, below
chance-level accuracy would be expected for the lowest level of
persistence.
Our results are thus consistent with a metacognitive interpre-
tation according to which infants’ post-decision persistence
reflects an internal—second-order—evaluation of their decision
(see the Supplemental Experimental Procedures for additional
discussion). Another test would be to show that infants not
only persist differentially in their choices depending on accuracy
but also use the output of this monitoring process to adjust
behavior. In other words, if we observe that infants are able to
regulate subsequent choices depending on an evaluation of a
first—distinct—decision, we can infer that some form of meta-
cognitive evaluation has taken place. In experiment 2, we thus
tested whether infants can rely on confidence to appropriately
select a secondary action that is totally distinct from the pointing
response. Whereas the first-order task was identical to experi-
ment 1, the metacognitive task consisted of deciding whether
to confirm or invalidate the initial choice (see Figure 2A). After se-
lecting one of the two boxes by pointing, infants received, in half
of the trials, a box that they could not open by themselves. In
order to recover its content, infants were consequently forced
to either persist in their choice by asking their caregiver to
open the selected box or revise their choice by reaching toward
the alternative box. We predicted that infants’ choice to persist
or change their mind should depend on the accuracy of their
initial decision. In addition, the relationship between first-order
(pointing choice accuracy) and second-order (confirming or
revising their initial choice) variables should vary with the diffi-
culty of the task (memorization delay).
18-Month-Old Infants Use Decision Confidence to
Regulate Subsequent Behavior
Infants’ (n = 22) pointing accuracy was significantly above
chance level for the delay of 3 s (t(21) = 2.9; p < 0.01), but not3040 Current Biology 26, 3038–3045, November 21, 2016for the delay of 12 s (t(21) = 1.4; p > 0.17) (see Figure S2). Infants
always selected one of the two possible second-order actions
after making a pointing response. Thus, a two-point confidence
scale was obtained by dummy coding ‘‘ask for help’’ responses
as ones (i.e., persistence) and ‘‘changes of mind’’ as zeros
(i.e., no persistence). This persistence index was then used to
construct individual type 2 ROC curves to test whether infants’
choice of a second action depended on accuracy (Figure 2B).
Mean area under the type 2 ROC curves was significantly greater
than chance level (t(21) = 2.26; p < 0.04), showing that infants
persisted more in their initial choice after correct compared to
incorrect responses. Examining the impact of task difficulty on
this effect revealed an interaction between delay and accuracy
(c2 = 11.25; p < 0.001; see Figure 2C) but no significant effect
of delay (c2 = 0.48; p > 0.4). This interaction reflected the fact
that the impact of accuracy on the second-order measure
was significant only for the shortest delay of 3 s (c2 = 13.61;
p < 0.001). Thus, infants’ probability of asking for help versus
changing their mind was determined by the accuracy of their
initial choice, but only when the memorization delay allowed
for above chance-level performance. These results demonstrate
that infants can rely on an internal evaluation of confidence in
order to regulate subsequent behavior.
Our experiments reveal behavioral indices of decision confi-
dence in infants. Yet it remains unclear whether such metacog-
nitive evaluations rely on the same mechanisms as those used
by adults when reporting confidence. To examine further the
mechanisms underlying metacognitive sensitivity in infancy, we
turned to error monitoring. Indeed, the neural computations
underlying this second metacognitive process are well docu-
mented in adults [1, 18]. By probing for comparable neural signa-
tures in infants, onemight thus demonstrate sharedmechanisms
across the two populations. A particularly interesting signature is
the ERN, an event-related potential observed over fronto-central
electrodes whenever subjects make an error [1, 14, 15]. Studies
in human adults show that the ERN relates to post-error adjust-
ments and error-correcting activity [12, 19] and originates in
the anterior cingulate cortex [1, 20]. They also suggest that
this component reflects mechanisms of performance monitoring
that function by comparing the response that should have
been made with the response that was actually performed
[1, 14, 21, 22].
An equivalent of the ERN has been documented when 6- and
9-month-old infants perceive an unsuspected event in their envi-
ronment (i.e., a conflict between expected and actual events)
[23]. More precisely, this component was evoked by simple nu-
merical violations, and thus was driven by sensory information in
the external environment. An important question is whether an
ERN can be generated in infants in response to their own error
(i.e., following a conflict between required and actual responses)
[22]. This finding would demonstrate that infants monitor their
own errors in the absence of any external feedback, by relying
on internal, metacognitive computations.
Behavioral Indices of Decision Confidence and Neural
Signatures of Error Monitoring in 12-Month-Old Infants
In experiment 3, we simultaneously recorded eye movements
and event-related potentials in 12-month-old infants (n = 55)
while they engaged in a paradigm allowing for the parallel
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Figure 2. Experiment 2
(A) Experimental design. The two boxes contained a lid, which could only be opened by an adult. Although one of them had a slit such that infants were able to
directly reach for its content (unsealed box), there was no slit in the other box, rendering its content unreachable without the help of an adult (sealed box).
Importantly, both boxes looked identical from the infants’ point of view, such that they could not know which box they were selecting (sealed versus unsealed
box). During the familiarization phase (four trials), infants saw the experimenter hide a biscuit in one of two boxes. The experimenter then asked them to point to
indicate where they remembered the biscuit to be. As soon as infants produced a pointing response, the selected box was pushed forward. During the first two
trials, the biscuit was hidden in the unsealed box, so infants could directly recover it. During the last two trials, the biscuit was hidden in the sealed box, so as to
teach infants to ask their caregiver to open it for them. The test phase (eight trials) was similar to the familiarization phase except for two elements. First, a variable
memorization delay (3 or 12 s) was introduced. Second, the biscuits were now hidden half of the time in the unsealed box and the other half in the sealed box.
Importantly, infants selected the sealed and unsealed boxes equally often (t(21) = 0.3; p > 0.7), showing that they could not discriminate the two boxes before
pointing. Selection of the sealed box forced infants to either confirm their initial choice by asking their caregiver to open it or invalidate their initial choice by turning
to the alternative box, whose content was directly reachable.
(B) Mean type 2 ROC curve. Individual type 2 ROC curves were constructed by plotting the probability of producing one type of secondary response for correct
trials against the probability of producing the same type of secondary response for incorrect trials.
(C) Relationship between persistence and accuracy depending on task difficulty. A persistence index was obtained for each subject by coding secondary actions
in a binary fashion, with zeros corresponding to changes of mind (i.e., no persistence) and ones corresponding to asking for help (i.e., persistence). Persistence
indices were then averaged separately for correct and incorrect trials, per levels of difficulty, for each participant. Error bars show SEMs.
See also Figure S2.measurement of behavioral indices of confidence and neural sig-
natures of error monitoring. This allowed us to examine (1) meta-
cognitive abilities at earlier stages of development, during which
pointing cannot be used reliably, and (2) the neural mechanisms
underlying these metacognitive abilities. The first-order task
consisted of looking toward a face appearing briefly on the left
or right side of a screen. Faces were masked and presented
for durations ranging from 50 to 300 ms (see Figure 3A), so as
to induce various levels of visibility [24]. After a delay, the same
stimulus consistently reappeared at the same location but now
as a fully visible and rewarding face. After performing their initialchoice, infants could thus decide towait for the rewarding face at
the same location (i.e., keep looking), look to the other side (i.e.,
change their mind), or look away (i.e., give up). This measure
of post-decision persistence was used to assess infants’ confi-
dence in their initial choice.
Infants oriented toward masked faces with above chance-
level accuracy (t(54) = 5.42; p < 0.001; gaze shift direction was
estimated from the offset of the face; mean response times are
presented in Figure S3). There was a significant modulation of
performance by stimulus duration (F(1,54) = 13.87; p < 0.001;
see Figure 3B), reflecting the fact that performances were aboveCurrent Biology 26, 3038–3045, November 21, 2016 3041
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(A) Experimental design. EEG and eye movements were recorded while infants were presented with a masked-face detection paradigm. As soon as the infant
looked at the central fixation (red circle), a face was presented for variable durations (50–300 ms in steps of 50 ms) to the left or right side of the screen. A waiting
period then followed, in which nothing but backward masks and the fixation remained on the screen. During this period, the first look toward one or the other side
of the screen was taken as the first-order response, and the consecutive time the infant was willing to wait in the selected frame after the initial saccade was taken
as post-decision persistence. Following the waiting period, the face reappeared on the same side for 3 s, now as a reward (i.e., along with music and blinking,
multi-colored stars).
(B) Mean accuracy of first looks depending on the duration of the masked face. The red dashed line represents chance level. *p < 0.05; ***p < 0.001.
(C) Relationship between PTs and first-order accuracy depending on visibility. PTs were averaged separately for correct and incorrect trials for each level of
visibility.
(D) Mean accuracy as a function of task difficulty, computed separately for short (<median) and long (>median) PTs. There was a marginal interaction between
PTs and task difficulty (F(1,54) = 3.7; p = 0.06), reflecting the fact that PTs significantly predicted accuracy in the visible (F(1,54) = 6; p < 0.02) but not in the invisible
condition (p > 0.7). Post hoc tests on visible trials further revealed that accuracywasmarginally lower for short PTs as compared to long PTs (t(54) = 1.97; p = 0.06),
and that the accuracy for short PTs remained higher than chance level (t(54) = 2.2; p < 0.04), whereas the accuracy for long PTs was greatly above chance level
(t(54) = 5.92; p < 0.001). Note that mean accuracy did not differ from chance level when considering only the tenth-shortest PTs (t(25) = 0.5; p > 0.6).
Error bars show SEMs. See also Figure S3.chance level for durations ranging from 200 to 300 ms (all
p values < 0.05) but not for durations from 50 to 150 ms (all
p values > 0.2). Therefore, subsequent analyses collapsed the
200–300 ms durations, considered the visible condition (i.e.,
with above chance-level accuracy: t(54) = 6.57; p < 0.001),
versus the 50–150 ms durations, considered the invisible condi-
tion (i.e., with chance-level accuracy: t < 1). On the basis of pre-
vious studies revealing that faces presented above a certain
perceptual threshold trigger the same neural mechanisms as
those associated with perceptual consciousness in adults, we
might assume that infants were conscious of the faces only in
the visible condition [24, 25]. We then inspected how PTs were3042 Current Biology 26, 3038–3045, November 21, 2016affected by accuracy but found no significant main effect for
this contrast. Critically, however, there was a significant interac-
tion with stimulus visibility (F(1,54) = 4.63; p < 0.04; Figure 3C),
reflecting infants’ differential persistence for correct versus
incorrect trials when the masked face was visible (t(54) = 2.93;
p < 0.005) but not when it was invisible (t < 1). This behavioral
pattern is suggestive of confidence, and extends the results of
experiment 1 to younger infants (see also Figure 3D for condi-
tional accuracy plots of accuracy depending on PTs).
The EEG analysis was performed with response-locked event-
related potentials over fronto-central electrodes, following the
standard procedure for computing an ERN [14, 15, 22]. We first
M
ea
n 
A
m
pl
itu
de
 in
 P
ea
k 
W
in
do
w
 (
V
)
Masked Face Visibility
Visible Invisible
-14 
-12
-10 
-8
-6 
-4
-2 
0
2 
Incorrect 
Correct
Visible 
Invisible 
A
m
pl
itu
de
 
V
Seconds
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
A
m
pl
itu
de
 
V
Seconds
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
B A
C D 
-2-1012
Visible  Invisible 
Difference
Visible - Invisible 
D
iff
er
en
ce
C
or
re
ct
 - 
In
co
rr
ec
t 
Figure 4. Experiment 3: Event-Related Potential Results
(A) Mean amplitude in peak window depending on first-order accuracy and visibility. Error bars show SEMs.
(B) Scalp topographies showing statistical significance maps (t values) of the difference between correct and incorrect trials in the peak window, computed
separately for visible and invisible trials.
(C) Response-locked event-related potentials (ERPs) in the fronto-central cluster depending on first-order accuracy and visibility. The dashed box and arrow
show the window used to compute the mean amplitude of the peak shown in (A).
(D) Difference waves for visible and invisible trials derived from response-locked ERPs by subtracting correct from incorrect trials. Bars above the time series
show significant clusters with a Monte Carlo p value < 0.05.
See also Figure S4.collapsed all conditions to identify components of interest inde-
pendent of stimulus visibility and response accuracy. Using clus-
ter-based permutation (see the Supplemental Experimental Pro-
cedures), we identified a significant negative deflection peaking
around 350ms following the offset of the saccadic response (see
Figure S4A). Crucially, the amplitude of this negativity was signif-
icantly increased for incorrect compared to correct responses in
the visible condition (t(43) = 2.61; p < 0.02) but not in the invisible
condition (t < 1), leading to a significant interaction (F(1,43) = 4.7;
p < 0.05; see Figures 4A and 4B). Further analyses of difference
waves between correct and incorrect responses confirmed this
result, by revealing a significant cluster solely in the visible con-
dition (Figures 4C and 4D). Notably, the latency of this compo-
nent (around 400 ms) is much slower than what is usually
observed in adults (around 100 ms). Yet, it is consistent with
Berger and colleagues’ study, in which an ERN peaking around
400 ms was measured when infants observed a numerical viola-
tion in their external environment [23]. This delay of processing
probably reflects the weak myelination of cortico-cortical
connections achieved at the end of the first year of life [26, 27],especially in frontal areas where the ERN originates [20, 28].
Importantly, an ERN was elicited after incorrect decisions
made on supraliminal stimuli but not on faces presented below
the threshold of visibility. This observation mirrors a functional
property of error detection in adults, for which an ERN similarly
occurs for errors made on consciously reportable events but
not on subliminal stimuli [14].
Thus, core neural mechanisms of error monitoring in adults are
already functional at 12 months of age. Notably, when adults
consciously detect their errors, the ERN is followed by a positive,
slightly more posterior component (i.e., the error positivity, or Pe)
[1, 15, 29]. Here we did not observe this component. This might
suggest that more explicit components of error detection follow
a slower developmental course. However, it is equally probable
that our design was not suitable to detect this component. In
particular, because infants often made a second saccade after
making their first response, a Pe might have been elicited but
would remain undetectable because of movement artifacts.
Further studies should be especially designed to examine the
presence of this component in infants. Another interestingCurrent Biology 26, 3038–3045, November 21, 2016 3043
question is whether the neural mechanisms reflected in the ERN
are also involved in the computation of confidence. In adults,
although the ERN amplitude varies with confidence ratings
[22], the exact nature of this relationship remains unclear (e.g.,
see [30]). Because our persistence measure was based on look-
ing behavior, here wewere not able to elucidate the relationships
between the ERN and the behavioral measure of confidence (see
Figures S4B and S4C), and further studies are required to inves-
tigate this issue.
DISCUSSION
Our results reveal that, from early stages of development, human
infants can estimate decision confidence (experiments 1 and 3),
monitor their own errors (experiment 3), and use these metacog-
nitive evaluations to guide subsequent behavior (experiment 2).
This might seem surprising, because previous research relying
on verbal reports documented a late emergence of the ability
to provide accurate metacognitive judgments, around 3–4 years
of age [3–5, 31–33]. Yet verbally reporting one’s own mental
states involves more than pure metacognitive monitoring
[34, 35]. Consistent with this idea, metacognition has been found
to involve both explicit and implicit processing modes in adults
[15, 34–36], and a few recent studies found that children can
pass metacognitive tasks at younger ages when no verbal report
is required [31–33, 37]. In particular, we found that 20-month-old
infants are able to ask for help non-verbally in order to avoid
making errors [37]. Although this study revealed that toddlers
prospectively estimate their own uncertainty, it remained un-
known whether they can engage in post-decisional metacogni-
tive evaluations. Here we show that infants are also able to
retrospectively evaluate the accuracy of their own decisions.
Another important issue is whether metacognition can be pre-
sent in preverbal infants or, rather, emerges with the ability to
give epistemic reports. Here, by testing 12-month-old infants
and relying on totally implicit approaches, we show that meta-
cognitive capacities are functional before infants start producing
their first words.
What are themechanismsunderlying these competences?Our
findings are in line with theoretical frameworks proposing that
metacognitive sensitivity stems from simple evaluations of the
quality of internal representations [1, 6–8]. These rudimentary
neural computations could in principle already be present in the
infant brain [33]. One possibility is thus that metacognitive opera-
tions are computed automatically as soon as infants start making
decisions. By contrast, more explicit aspects of metacognition,
allowing infants to effectively communicate their meta-represen-
tations to others, would emerge slowly across development.
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